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ABSTRACT 
This essay examines the distributional effects of 
a “cap-and-dividend” policy for reducing carbon 
emission in the United States: a policy that auc-
tions carbon permits and rebates the revenue 
to the public on an equal per capita basis. The 
aim of the policy is to reduce U.S. emissions of 
carbon dioxide, the main pollutant causing 
global warming, while at the same time protect-
ing the real incomes of middle-income and 
lower-income American families. The number of 
permits is set by a statutory cap on carbon 
emissions that gradually diminishes over time. 
The sale of carbon permits will generate very 
large revenues, posing the critical question of 
who will get the money. The introduction of car-
bon permits – or, for that matter, any policy to 
curb emissions – will raise prices of fossil fuels,  
 
and have a regressive impact on income  distri-
bution, since fuel expenditures represent a lar-
ger fraction of income for lower-income 
households than for upper-income households. 
The net effect of carbon emission-reduction 
policies depends on who gets the money that 
households pay in higher prices. We find that a 
cap-and-dividend policy would have a strongly 
progressive net effect. Moreover, the majority of 
U.S. households would be net winners in purely 
monetary terms: that is, their real incomes, af-
ter paying higher fuel prices and receiving their 
dividends, would rise. From the standpoints of 
both distributional equity and political feasibil-
ity, a cap-and-dividend policy is therefore an 
attractive way to curb carbon emissions.          s                
s
 
Key words: Global warming; fossil fuels; climate 
change; carbon permits; cap-and-dividend;  
cap-and-auction; cap-and-trade. 
JEL codes: H22, H23, Q48, Q52, Q54, Q58 
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Policies to curb emissions of carbon dioxide – 
the main cause of global warming – will inevita-
bly raise the prices of fossil fuels: coal, oil, and 
natural gas. The resulting price increases will 
reduce the real incomes of American families, 
striking hardest at those who can afford it least: 
lower-income households for whom fuel costs 
represent a higher fraction of their expenditures. 
The political feasibility of U.S. efforts to curb car-
bon emissions may hinge on whether policies 
are designed to protect middle-class and poor 
families from these adverse income effects. 
A “cap-and-dividend” policy offers a simple and 
practical way to do this. The policy would auction 
carbon permits – rather than giving them free-of-
charge to historic polluters – and then return all 
or most of the revenue to American families on 
an equal per person basis. Families who con-
sume lower-than-average amounts of fossil fuels 
come out ahead, receiving more in dividends 
than they pay in higher prices. Those who con-
sume more-than-average amounts pay more.  
The policy has three basic steps: 
• First, U.S. carbon emissions are capped at a 
level that gradually declines over time. One 
widely discussed target is to reduce emis-
sions 80% below their current level by the 
year 2050.  
• Second, based on the cap in a given year, 
permits are auctioned to firms that bring 
fossil carbon into the economy (whether 
through domestic extraction or imports). The 
supply of permits in a given year is fixed by 
the cap; their price depends on the demand 
for them. 
• Third, revenue from the sale of permits is 
deposited into a trust fund and paid out 
equally to every woman, man, and child in 
the country. In addition, some fraction of  
the revenue initially may be earmarked for 
other uses, such as transitional adjustment 
assistance. 
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This paper calculates the net effects of a cap-
and-dividend policy on income distribution in the 
United States. We estimate that a permit price of 
$200 per ton of carbon would reduce U.S. emis-
sions by approximately seven percent. The re-
sulting increases in the prices of fossil fuels, and 
in the prices of goods and services produced 
with them, would raise the cost of living of the 
median American family by $1,570 per year. The 
price increases would represent a larger per-
centage of family income in poor households 
than in more affluent households (see Figure A).  
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The revenue from the sale of carbon permits 
would amount to roughly $200 billion per year. 
If this revenue is recycled to the public equally, 
the majority of households receive more in divi-
dends than they pay as a result of higher fossil 
fuel prices. The net impact ranges from a 14.8% 
income gain for the poorest 20% of families 
(and a 24% gain for the poorest 10%) to a 2.4% 
loss for richest 20% (see Figure B).  
Initially earmarking a modest fraction of the 
carbon revenues for other uses, such as transi-
tional adjustment assistance, could further en-
hance the appeal of the cap-and-dividend policy. 
Up to 10% of the carbon revenues can be dedi-
cated to other uses while maintaining positive 
net benefits for roughly 50% of households. 
Withholding carbon revenues beyond this 
threshold would push the net beneficiary share 
of the population below half. 
A cap-and-dividend policy will assert the princi-
ple of common ownership of nature’s wealth: 
the right to benefit from our share of the Earth’s 
capacity to absorb carbon emissions is allo-
cated equally to all Americans. It will protect the 
real incomes of the majority of Americans while 
curbing global warming and hastening the U.S. 
economy’s transition towards the energy 
sources of the future. From the standpoints of 
both distributional equity and political feasibility, 
a cap-and-dividend policy is therefore an attrac-
tive way to curb carbon emissions.        s
 I .  INTRODUCTION 
The time is coming when the United States  
government will enact policies to curb emissions 
of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, 
joining the efforts of other nations to confront the 
historic challenge of global warming. When this 
happens, a key question – from the standpoints 
of both fairness and political feasibility – will be 
how to protect the incomes of American families. 
The Clinton administration signed the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol, which envisioned a 7% cut in 
U.S. carbon emissions from their 1990 level by 
the year 2012. But the Senate refused to ratify 
the agreement, and when the government of 
George W. Bush came to power it announced it 
had “no interest” in the accord. 
Political winds in the country are now shifting. At 
the Group of Eight summit meeting in Germany 
in June 2007, the Bush administration agreed to 
re-enter international climate negotiations and 
to “seriously consider” a European plan to cut 
greenhouse gas emissions in half by 2050. A 
legislative proposal unveiled in August 2007 by 
U.S. Senators Joseph Lieberman and John War-
ner goes further, calling for a 70% reduction by 
2050. It now seems possible, even likely, that 
the U.S. will adopt a serious emissions-reduction 
policy early in the post-Bush administration. 
Any policy to curb carbon emissions will raise 
prices of fossil fuels – coal, oil, and natural gas – 
and the prices of other goods and services in 
proportion to the use of fossil fuels in supplying 
them. These price increases will reduce the real 
incomes of Americans in general, and low-income 
and middle-class American households in par-
ticular. But for every dollar paid by consumers in 
higher prices, someone else receives a dollar in 
additional income. Recycling this money to the 
public would protect real incomes of the majority 
of Americans. This paper examines how this can 
be done by a cap-and-dividend policy that distrib-
utes carbon revenues equally to all. 
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I I .  THE CARBON ECONOMY 
The United States is the world’s top emitter  
of carbon dioxide (CO2), the most important  
greenhouse gas. The burning of fossil fuels in  
the U.S. released 1.6 billion metric tons (mt) of 
carbon  (5.9  billion mt of CO2) in 2005. This is 
12% more than China, the second-largest emit-
ter, and 65% more than the EU-15 (see Figure 1a).  
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a. “Other” includes emissions from electricity generation from municipal solid waste and geothermal energy. 
b. Industrial emissions from coal include net coke imports. 
Source: Calculated from U.S. Energy Information Administration’s Historical Data Series. For details, see endnote 2. 
Fuel Source Petroleum Coal Natural Gas Other
a
total % via electricit
Residential 141.6 695.4 372.8 4.1 1213.9 69.4
Transportation 1902.7 3.8 32.7 0.0 1939.2 0.2
Industrialb 465.4 747.4 519.9 3.3 1736.0 38.1
Commercial 88.2 669.0 272.9 3.9 1034.1 77.4
Total 2597.9 2115.6 1198.3 11.3 5923.2 39
(%) 43.9 35.7 20.2 0.2 100
2In per capita terms, U.S. emissions are five 
times higher than China’s and more than double 
those of the EU-15 (see Figure 1b). 
The composition of U.S. carbon dioxide emis-
sions across fuels and sectors is shown in Table 
1. Petroleum accounts for roughly 44% of emis-
sions, coal for 36%, and natural gas for 20%. 
Electricity generation using these fuels accounts 
for 39% of the total, with coal-fired plants ac-
counting for more than four-fifths of this 
amount. Transportation accounts for roughly 
one-third of total emissions, industry for a fur-
ther 29%, residential energy use for 20%, and 
commercial energy use for 18%. 
The “carbon footprint” of individual American 
households – the amount of carbon emissions 
generated in supplying the goods and services 
they consume – varies depending on their total 
expenditure and its composition. Table 2 shows  
how expenditure patterns varied across house-
holds in 2003, ranging from the poorest tenth of 
the population, whose annual per capita expen-
diture was under $2,000, to the richest tenth, 
whose per capita expenditure was close to 
$30,000.3
The carbon content of various categories of 
consumption items can be calculated from in-
put-output accounts. These provide detailed 
data on the inputs used by each industry, mak-
ing it possible to trace the price effects of a 
change in fossil fuel prices from industry to 
prices. For this purpose we rely on calculations 
by Metcalf (1999), updating his measure to re-
flect 2003 prices.4 The results are presented in 
 T AB L E  2 :  CON SUMPT I ON  PAT T E RNS  B Y  EX PENDITURE  DEC ILE ,  2 00 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations  from Consumer Expenditure Survey. 
Food Industrial 
goods
Services Electricity Household 
fuels
Car 
fuels
Air 
transport
Other 
transport
1 1927 659 225 729 128 52 124 3 8
2 3521 1118 426 1418 227 83 226 11 13
3 4736 1361 638 2001 278 113 304 23 18
4 5991 1621 904 2559 341 144 375 28 19
5 7380 1813 1188 3351 349 164 444 45 27
6 8847 2051 1795 3849 380 186 489 67 30
7 10711 2297 2219 4901 415 211 537 83 46
8 13228 2559 3343 5880 459 214 614 105 54
9 17178 3081 4821 7489 519 273 735 177 83
10 29943 4292 10908 12363 642 334 888 367 149
Total 10346 2085 2647 4454 374 177 474 91 45
Per capita 
expenditure decile
Average per capita expenditures by consumption category ($)Per capita 
expenditure ($)
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Table 3. As one would expect, the most carbon-
intensive categories of consumption are elec-
tricity, household fuels (primarily heating oil and 
natural gas) and car fuels, each of which gener-
ates more than two metric tons of carbon per 
$1000 expenditure. The least carbon-intensive 
category is services, for which the correspond-
ing figure is 80 kilograms. 
Combining the information in Tables 2 and 3, 
we can examine the average carbon emissions 
from U.S. household consumption across the 
range of per capita expenditure. The results are 
presented in Table 4. The consumption of the 
average American, with per capita expenditure 
of about $10,000, generates approximately 3.7 
metric tons of carbon emissions.5 Direct energy 
use in the form of car fuels, residential electric-
ity, and household fuels (mainly heating oil and 
natural gas) accounts for roughly three-fifths of 
these emissions. Indirect use, via carbon emis-
sions generated in producing other goods and 
services consumed by the household, account 
for the remaining two-fifths.  
As one might expect, households with higher 
expenditure generally have bigger carbon foot-
prints. As shown in the final column of Table 4, 
carbon emissions per person in the richest dec-
ile (tenth) of the population are more than dou-
ble the national average, and more than eight 
times higher than the lowest decile. 
T AB L E  3 :  CARB ON  EMI SSI ONS  PER  D OLLA R  
EX PENDITURE  B Y  CON SUMPT IO N  CATEGOR Y  
 
Consumption category tC per $1000 (2003 dollars) 
Food 0.15 
Industrial goods 0.14 
Services 0.08 
Electricity 2.82 
Household fuels 2.64 
Car fuels 2.08 
Air transport 0.56 
Other transport 0.30 
 
Source: Calculated from Metcalf (1999); see text for 
details. 
Carbon emissions per dollar decline, however, 
as household expenditure rises. In the top dec-
ile, one dollar of expenditure on average gener-
ates 0.27 kilograms (kg) of carbon emissions; in 
the lowest decile the corresponding figure is 
0.50 kg. The reason lies in their consumption 
patterns, as can be seen in Table 3: the poor 
spend a larger fraction of their household 
budget on electricity and fuels, while more af-
fluent households spend a larger fraction on 
services and industrial goods. It so happens 
that necessities, which account for a larger 
share of the expenditure of the poor, are more-
carbon-intensive than luxuries, which account 
for a larger share of the expenditure of the well-
 T AB L E  4 :  CARB ON  EMI SSI ONS  B Y  EX PENDITURE  DEC ILE  
( M E T R I C  T O N S  O F  C A R B O N  P E R  Y E A R )  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 1927 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.36 0.15 0.26 0.002 0.002 0.96
2 3521 0.18 0.06 0.10 0.64 0.23 0.47 0.006 0.004 1.69
3 4736 0.21 0.09 0.15 0.79 0.32 0.63 0.013 0.005 2.21
4 5991 0.25 0.13 0.21 0.96 0.39 0.78 0.016 0.006 2.74
5 7380 0.27 0.17 0.27 0.99 0.46 0.92 0.025 0.008 3.11
6 8847 0.30 0.27 0.32 1.07 0.51 1.02 0.037 0.009 3.53
7 10711 0.34 0.33 0.41 1.17 0.58 1.12 0.047 0.014 4.01
8 13228 0.37 0.50 0.50 1.30 0.59 1.28 0.059 0.016 4.60
9 17178 0.44 0.72 0.64 1.47 0.75 1.53 0.099 0.025 5.66
10 29943 0.59 1.63 1.08 1.81 0.91 1.85 0.206 0.044 8.13
Total 10346 0.31 0.39 0.37 1.06 0.49 0.98 0.051 0.013 3.67
Car 
fuels
Industrial 
goods
Services Electricity Household 
fuels
Total carbon 
emissions per 
capita
Air 
transport
Other 
transport
Per capita 
expenditure 
decile
Per capita 
expenditure ($)
Average per capita carbon emissions by expenditure category
Food
Source: Authors’ calculations using data in Tables 2 and 3. 
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to-do. As a result, carbon emissions rise with 
household expenditure at a diminishing rate 
(see Figure 2). As discussed in the next section, 
this concave relationship has important implica-
tions for the distributional effects of public poli-
cies to reduce carbon emissions.  
 
I I I .  THE CASE FOR A  
CAP-AND-DIVIDEND POLICY  
The most reliable way to reduce carbon emis-
sions is to establish a “cap,” a limit on the total 
amount of fossil-fuel carbon that enters the U.S. 
economy in a given year. The cap can gradually 
be lowered over time to meet targets for emis-
sions reductions in future years. Based on the 
cap, a fixed number of annual permits are issued 
to suppliers of fossil fuels, including both domes-
tic producers and importers. Whether these per-
mits are sold or given away, they represent a 
claim on a scarce resource – the U.S. share of 
the biosphere’s capacity to absorb and recycle 
carbon – and as such they have economic value.  
The net effect of emission-reduction policies on 
household incomes depends on: 
(i) how the household is impacted by higher 
prices for fossil fuels, and 
(ii) how the economic value represented by car-
bon permits is distributed.  
If the permits are given away, a key issue is who 
gets them. If they are sold, a key issue is who 
gets the money. 
If the permits are given free-of-charge to energy 
companies – based, for example, on their his-
toric levels of sales of fossil fuels – the result is 
a windfall gain to these firms, or more precisely, 
to their shareholders.6 If the permits are auc-
tioned to the highest bidder and the proceeds 
are retained by the government, the revenue is 
similar to that from a tax, and the money can be 
used to increase government spending and/or 
cut other taxes. In this paper we analyze a third 
option, in which the permits are auctioned and 
the revenue is rebated to the public on an equal  
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per capita basis, a policy sometimes termed a 
“sky trust” (Barnes 2001).7 We refer to these 
three policy options as “cap-and-giveaway,” 
“cap-and-spend,” and “cap-and-dividend,” re-
spectively (see Figure 3). 
 
F I G UR E  3 :  T HR E E  P O L I C Y  OPT I O N S  F OR   
C A R B O N  P E R M I T  A L L O C A T IO N  
Cap-and-Auction
Cap-and-Dividend Cap-and-Spend
Cap-and-Giveaway or
or
 
 
From open access to common wealth 
The enactment of policies to curb carbon emis-
sions is tantamount to the creation of property 
rights to the sky, or more precisely, to the car-
bon-absorptive capacity of the biosphere. In the 
absence of such policies, this is an “open ac-
cess” resource, in principle freely available to all 
but in practice disproportionately available to 
those with the wealth and power to claim it: 
those who burn the most fossil fuel.8 Govern-
ment regulations, carbon taxes, and carbon 
permits all assert the right to regulate access to 
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this resource, effectively converting it into a 
form of property.  
The question then becomes, who are the rightful 
owners of this property? If we believe that the 
gifts of creation are held by all of us in common, 
rather than being the property of private owners 
or the government, then the answer is clear: it 
belongs equally to every woman, man, and child 
in the country.  
A cap-and-dividend policy would transform the 
U.S. share of the Earth’s carbon-absorptive ca-
pacity from an open-access resource into the 
common wealth of all Americans. As a way to 
curb U.S. carbon emissions, this policy has four 
attractive features: 
• First, the cap-and-dividend policy puts into 
practice the principle of common ownership 
of nature’s wealth: rights to benefit from the 
carbon-absorptive capacities of the bio-
sphere are allocated equally to all.  
• Second, the cap-and-dividend policy protects 
the real incomes of the majority of the popu-
lation in the face of higher prices for fossil 
fuels, surmounting a major political im-
pediment to the adoption of policies to curb 
global warming. 
• Third, the cap-and-dividend policy results in a 
progressive redistribution of income, the 
scale of which depends on the level of the 
carbon charges and how the carbon intensity 
of household expenditure varies with income. 
• Fourth, unlike carbon taxes or a cap-and-
spend policy, the cap-and-dividend policy’s  
favorable distributional outcome does not 
hinge on the willingness and ability of the 
government to do “the right thing” – however 
this may be defined – with present and fu-
ture carbon revenues.9 
 
How would a cap-and-dividend policy work? 
The cap-and-dividend policy would deposit the 
revenues from auction sales of carbon permits 
into a trust fund, an autonomous institution 
apart from the government budget, akin to the 
Social Security Trust Fund. These revenues 
would then be rebated to individuals on an 
equal per person basis.  
Carbon revenues would be most easily collected 
“upstream,” at the mine heads, oil refineries, 
natural gas pipelines, and ports where fossil fuels 
enter the U.S. economy. Nationwide there would 
be roughly 2000 such collection points (Kopp et 
al. 1999; CBO 2001). The costs of collecting the 
revenue would represent a very small fraction of 
the amount collected; the administrative costs of 
petroleum taxes and excise duties currently 
range from 0.12 to 0.25% of revenue (Smulders 
and Vollebergh, 2001, p. 116).10
A fixed number of carbon permits would be auc-
tioned (monthly, quarterly, or annually), with the 
number determined by the national carbon cap 
at any given point in time. Permit holders would 
be entitled to bring fossil carbon into the econ-
omy within a specified time (say, one year from 
the date of purchase of the permit). A secondary 
market in permits could emerge – permit hold-
ers who decide not to use their carbon allot-
ment could sell it to others – but with frequent 
auctions and limited permit life spans, this mar-
ket would likely be small relative to the total 
number of permits. 
The number of permits issued would diminish 
over time, as the cap on carbon emissions is 
gradually tightened. Issuing a fixed number of 
permits rather than setting a fixed carbon 
charge (a “carbon tax”) would guarantee that 
the nation’s emission-reduction objectives are 
achieved. The price of the permits would de-
pend on demand and supply. When the econ-
omy is booming, for example, higher demand for 
permits will lead to a higher price than when the 
economy is sluggish. Similarly, if higher fossil 
fuel prices and other policies spark rapid im-
provements in energy efficiency and develop-
ment of renewable energy sources, the carbon 
permit price will be lower than if these occur 
more slowly. In contrast, setting a fixed price 
instead of a fixed number of permits would al-
low the quantity of carbon emissions to vary 
depending on these and other factors. Given the 
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uncertainties as to the extent of emission reduc-
tions, the price-setting approach also could be 
more vulnerable to erroneous forecasts or po-
litical manipulations that undermine emission-
reduction goals. 
Revenues from the sale of carbon permits 
would be paid out equally to every man, woman, 
and child in the country. One way to distribute 
these dividends would be to issue “Sky Trust 
cards” that could be used at automatic teller 
machines (ATMs) to withdraw cash. If permit 
auctions are held quarterly, the balances in 
every individual’s account would be topped up 
quarterly, too. As with bank accounts, individu-
als could check their balances online, as well as 
at the ATM. The administrative costs of issuing 
Sky Trust cards would be no greater than the 
current cost of issuing Social Security cards; in 
fact, after the initial distribution to existing 
holders of Social Security cards, the two opera-
tions could be combined.  
In the case of children, an alternative way to 
distribute carbon revenues would be to accumu-
late their dividends in individual development 
accounts (IDAs) until they reach the age of 
eighteen. They could withdraw funds as they 
enter adulthood, perhaps with rules or incen-
tives to encourage investment in further educa-
tion or purchases of homes or businesses. 
The introduction of carbon permits would alter 
relative prices throughout the economy. Fossil 
fuels, and goods and services whose supply 
relies heavily on them, would become more ex-
pensive, strengthening incentives to invest in 
energy efficiency and non-fossil energy sources. 
The energy investment playing field, which is 
currently tilted in favor of fossil fuels by the im-
plicit subsidy resulting from free use of the 
Earth’s finite capacity to recycle emissions, 
would become more level. The playing field 
could be further leveled by ending the explicit 
government subsidies currently given to fossil-
fuel industries in the form of tax breaks and 
royalty-free  access  to  public lands. Redirection 
of   subsidies   to   public   investment   in   energy  
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efficiency and renewable energy would comple- 
ment the stimulus to private investment arising 
from the realignment of relative prices. 
The redirection of private investment is crucial 
for any strategy to curb global warming. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(2007, p. 13), which foresees future energy in-
vestments totaling more than $20 trillion 
worldwide between now and 2030, observes 
that limiting global carbon emissions to 2005 
levels by 2030 “would require a large shift in 
the pattern of investment, although the net ad-
ditional investment required ranges from negli-
gible to 5-10%.” 
As documented below, a cap-and-dividend pol-
icy would protect the real incomes of the major-
ity of American families in the face of rising 
fossil fuel prices. But households and communi-
ties that currently depend on employment in 
fossil fuel-intensive industries, such as coal min-
ing, would nevertheless see income losses. To 
protect these vulnerable sectors, a fraction of 
the revenue from the sale of carbon permits 
could be earmarked initially for transitional ad-
justment assistance. For example, Barnes 
(2001) proposes a transition fund that initially 
would recycle 25% of the revenue and gradually 
be phased out over a ten-year period. 
Figure 4 summarizes the basic features of a 
cap-and-dividend policy: cap carbon emissions; 
auction permits to bring fossil carbon into the 
economy; distribute revenues from permit sales 
to the public, with a fraction initially earmarked  
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for transitional adjustment assistance; realign 
incentives for private investment; and redirect 
government subsidies to public investments in 
energy efficiency and renewable energy. 
In the next section, we analyze how a cap-and-
dividend policy would affect the distribution of 
income in the United States. Before doing so, 
we briefly review prior studies on the distri-
butional impacts of higher fossil fuel prices and 
carbon revenue recycling. 
 
Distributional impact of higher fossil fuel prices 
Carbon emission-reduction policies – whether in 
the form of regulations, carbon taxes, or caps 
and permits – will raise the price of fossil fuels, 
at least in the foreseeable future. The increased 
price is the flip side of reduced use. The higher 
cost of coal, oil, and natural gas in turn alters 
relative prices of goods and services throughout 
the economy in proportion to the carbon embod-
ied in their production and distribution. In the 
end, the price increases are passed along to 
consumers (although producers may absorb 
part of the cost via lower profit margins, a pos-
sibility to which we return below).  
The result of higher prices, in terms of absolute 
dollars, is that those who consume more fossil 
fuels directly in the form of energy, and indi-
rectly in the form of other goods and services 
whose supply uses fossil fuels, pay more. Since 
the rich generally consume more of most things 
than the poor, they pay more (although how 
much any specific household pays depends on 
its consumption decisions). Relative to total 
expenditure, however, the poor pay more as 
noted above. This means that carbon emission-
reduction policies have a regressive impact on 
income distribution – unless coupled with reve-
nue-recycling policies that protect the real in-
comes of the poor and middle classes. 
Based on the data in Table 4, for example, we 
can calculate that a $200/ton price for carbon 
would translate into a $215 rise in the cost of 
living for the average person in poorest decile, 
equivalent to more than 10 per cent of annual 
expenditure. The cost of living in richest decile 
would rise by $1,475 per person, but this would 
be equivalent to less than 5 per cent of annual 
expenditure. 
Previous studies have reached similar conclu-
sions. The U.S. Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO), in an analysis of the distributional impacts 
of carbon permits, estimated that the price ef-
fects would reduce real incomes in the lowest 
quintile of the income distribution by 3.3%, al-
most twice the 1.7% reduction in the highest 
quintile (CBO 2000, p. 21). In a follow-on study, 
Dinan and Rogers (2002, p. 212) report an even 
sharper disparity: reductions of 6.6% and 1.7% 
for the poorest and richest quintiles, respectively. 
In estimates based on a higher carbon price, 
Barnes and Breslow (2003, p. 144) report the 
cost for the lowest decile to be equivalent to 
16.8% of income, whereas the cost for the top 
decile is equivalent to 2.5% of income. 
Studies in other industrialized countries gener-
ally support the conclusion that carbon charges 
are regressive – taking a bigger slice in per-
centage terms from low-income households 
than from high-income households – or, at best, 
distributionally neutral or mixed. An analysis by 
Symons et al. (1994) found that a carbon tax in 
the United Kingdom would be “severely regres-
sive.” In Canada, Hamilton and Cameron (1994) 
concluded that a carbon tax would be “moder-
ately regressive.” Cornwell and Creedy (1996) 
likewise found that a carbon tax in Australia 
would be regressive. Symons et al. (2000) re-
ported regressive effects in Germany, France, 
and Spain, a mixed effect in the UK, and a neu-
tral effect in Italy. Klinge Jacobsen et al. (2003) 
and Wier et al. (2005) found that Denmark’s 
existing carbon taxes are regressive, and 
Brännlund and Nordström (2004) reported that 
increases in carbon taxes in Sweden would be 
regressive.11 Summarizing studies from a num-
ber of OECD countries, Cramton and Kerr 
(1999, p. 261) conclude: “The weak regressivity 
of carbon regulation appears to hold across 
countries and modeling techniques.”12   s 
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Carbon revenue recycling 
When consumers pay higher prices for goods and 
services, in proportion to the fossil carbon em-
bodied in them, a great deal of money changes 
hands. The net effect of carbon charges depends 
crucially on where this money goes. 
Recognizing that carbon charges could gener-
ate annual revenues of “tens or hundreds of 
billions of dollars,” the U.S. Congressional 
Budget Office (2000) compared two methods 
of allocating carbon emission allowances: sell-
ing them through an auction, or giving them 
away free-of-charge to the energy companies 
that produce and import fossil fuels. The CBO 
also compared two methods of revenue recy-
cling: reducing corporate taxes or rebating an 
identical lump-sum amount to each household. 
The only policy mix found to have a progressive 
distributional effect was the “sky trust” combi-
nation of permit sales and lump-sum redistri-
bution of the revenues.13 In this case, the 
regressive effect of fossil-fuel price increases 
was outweighed by the progressive effect of 
equal payments to each household. With a 
carbon charge of $100/ton, the CBO estimated 
that after-tax incomes in the lowest quintile of 
the income distribution would rise by 1.8%, 
while those of the top quintile would decrease 
by 0.9%. In an extension of the CBO analysis, 
Dinan and Rogers (2002) reported somewhat 
stronger redistributive impacts: a 3.5% rise in 
incomes for the lowest quintile, coupled with a 
1.6% decline for the top quintile.14
Both of these studies assumed that carbon 
charges create “deadweight losses” by reducing 
fossil fuel consumption (and also, in the Dinan 
and Rogers study, by lowering real returns to 
labor and capital and thereby reducing factor 
supplies). For example, when consumers curtail 
fuel consumption in response to higher prices, 
they experience welfare losses in the form of 
“the discomfort associated with keeping their 
house cooler in the winter or the loss in satis-
faction that would result from canceling a vaca-
tion because of high gasoline prices” (CBO 
2003, p. 3). The studies add these losses to the 
monetary costs borne by consumers in the form 
of higher prices for the fossil fuels that they con-
tinue to consume. 
Neither study accounted, however, for the wel-
fare gains that would result from reduced use of 
fossil fuels. These include benefits from the 
mitigation of climate change and “co-benefits” 
from reduced emissions of other pollutants, 
including airborne particulates and sulfur diox-
ide, that are released by burning fossil fuels.15 
Yet the rationale for policies to reduce carbon 
emissions is precisely that the welfare gains to 
society exceed the welfare losses. A compre-
hensive analysis of the welfare impacts of car-
bon emission-reduction policies would allocate 
these gains across households, too. In the ab-
sence of such an accounting, the incorporation 
of “deadweight losses” from carbon caps gives 
a misleading picture of net effects: it counts the 
cost of reducing carbon emissions without 
counting the benefits. 
The effect of this one-sided treatment of welfare 
effects is that the total costs of carbon charges 
(from higher prices plus “deadweight losses”) 
exceed the total amount of revenue to be recy-
cled (from higher prices alone). This understates 
the cap-and-dividend policy’s positive impact on 
incomes of low-income households, and over-
states its negative impact on those of high-
income households.  
In this paper, we adopt the simpler – and, in our 
view, more appropriate – procedure of estimat-
ing the monetary impacts of carbon charges and 
revenue recycling alone, without attempting to 
incorporate other welfare effects. Barnes and 
Breslow (2003) followed this procedure in a third 
analysis of the distributional impact of a cap-
and-dividend policy.16 They find that the bottom 
decile would receive a net benefit equal to 5.1% 
of income, while the top decile would bear a net 
loss of 0.9%. Roughly 70% of the population 
sees net gains, getting more back in dividends 
than they pay in higher fuel prices. Insofar as 
public policy is guided by majority rule, this au-
gurs well for the political feasibility of a cap-and-
dividend policy for curbing carbon emissions. 
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IV .  DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS  
OF A CAP-AND-DIVIDEND POLICY 
In this section we provide new estimates of the 
impacts of a cap-and-dividend policy on the dis-
tribution of income in the United States, taking 
into account both the impact of higher prices on 
consumers and the recycling of carbon revenue 
via equal per capita dividends.  
Apart from using more recent data for these 
calculations, our analysis differs from prior stud-
ies in several respects. We stratify households 
on the basis of expenditure rather than income, 
on the grounds that expenditure is a better 
proxy for lifetime income. Since households dif-
fer in size, we use expenditure per person rather 
than expenditure per household, on the grounds 
that this is a better measure of relative income. 
In addition to our baseline estimate of the net 
impact of a cap-and-dividend policy, the next 
section examines how the results change when 
some fraction of the carbon revenue is allocated 
initially to other uses, such as transitional ad-
justment assistance. In the appendix, we also 
show how the results are affected if we assume 
that some fraction of the cost of carbon permits 
is absorbed by producers via lower profit mar-
gins, instead of being entirely  “passed through” 
to consumers. 
 
What price for carbon? 
The amount of money that will be generated by 
the sale of carbon permits depends on both the 
quantity of permits sold and their price. The 
quantity is set by the carbon emission cap. The 
price depends on the price elasticities of de-
mand for fossil fuels, which translate changes in 
quantity into changes in prices.  
No one can be certain as to the precise magni-
tude of these elasticities, particularly in the long-
run when induced technological changes are 
taken into account. The Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (2007, p. 19), for example, 
reports that carbon prices of $20-295 per ton 
($5-80 per ton of CO2) in the year 2030 would be 
consistent with a trajectory for eventual stabiliza-
tion of atmospheric concentrations in the year 
2100. This wide price range illustrates why set-
ting a cap on the quantity of permits and letting 
market forces determine their price is preferable 
to setting a price on permits (or levying a carbon 
tax) and letting market forces determine the 
quantity of emissions. If our central aim is to 
meet a timetable for emissions reductions, fixing 
the quantity guarantees that we will hit the tar-
get. Fixing the price does not.  
While we do not know the precise magnitude of 
the price elasticity of demand for fossil fuels, we 
do know that it is inelastic, particularly in the 
short run; that is, the percentage change in 
price exceeds the associated percentage 
change in quantity demanded. With a price elas-
ticity of -0.2, for example, a 2% reduction in 
quantity requires a 10% increase in price. This 
means that the lower the quantity of emissions 
permitted under the cap (and the higher the 
price of the permits), the greater the total 
amount of revenue. 
We base the calculations that follow on a permit 
price of $200 per ton of carbon (tC). This is near 
the middle of the range of carbon price scenar-
ios used in the literature reviewed by Barnes 
and Breslow (2003, pp. 142-3). It is also close 
to the initial price of $180/tC ($50/tCO2) that a 
recent study by the MIT Joint Program on the 
Science and Policy of Global Change reckons is 
needed to achieve an 80% reduction in emis-
sions by the year 2050, with the price gradually 
rising to $730/tC by that year (Paltsev et al., 
2007). While the price we use for our calcula-
tions affects the magnitudes of costs and bene-
fits, it does not affect their distributional pattern 
across households: if the permit price were 
higher, then the costs, dividends, and net bene-
fits would rise; if the price were lower, they 
would be smaller.17
Table 5 shows how a $200/tC charge would 
change energy prices, assuming the cost to be 
entirely passed through into the price to end-
users. Price increases for gasoline, heating oil, 
and natural gas are in the 20-30% range. The 
price of coal rises much more steeply due to its  
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Note:  a. Coal and electricity prices refer to the year 2005. 
Sources: Price data from U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). For each individual fuel reference, see endnote 17. 
Fuel Price (2006) a Carbon charge Price increase  
Gasoline $2.53/gallon $0.53/gallon 21%
Heating oil $2.42/gallon $0.71/gallon 29%
Natural gas (residential) $13.76/1000 cu. ft. $3.26/1000 cu. ft. 24%
Coal (delivered to electric utilities) $31.22/short ton $116/short ton 371%
Electricity 9.45 cents/kwh 3.68 cents/kwh 39%
relatively low price and high carbon content, 
and electricity prices rise by nearly 40%. 
To calculate how these price increases impact 
households, we use the data on consumption 
patterns and the carbon content of goods and 
services reported in Tables 2 to 4. To incorpo-
rate the response of consumers to changes in 
relative prices, we use estimates drawn from 
other studies of the price elasticities of demand 
for the various consumption categories.18 These 
are reported in Table 6.  
We estimate that a $200 per ton carbon charge 
would reduce U.S. emissions by approximately 
7%. Put differently, if a cap on annual carbon 
emissions is set at 7% below current levels, and 
the corresponding number of carbon permits is 
auctioned to fossil fuel suppliers, we estimate 
that the market price for these permits will be 
approximately $200/tC. At this price, the total 
amount of revenue generated by permit sales is 
$198 billion per year.19                         S 
Baseline scenario 
In Table 7, we present the distributional impacts 
of a cap-and-dividend policy, with the entire cost 
of carbon permits passed through to consumers 
and the entire revenue from the sale of permits 
recycled to the public in the form of equal per 
capita dividends. The amount per person that 
households pay in higher prices is reported  
in the “charge” column. This amount rises  
with per capita household expenditure, from 
$215/person/year in the poorest decile to 
$1,475/person/year in the richest decile. 
 T AB L E  6 :  P R I CE  ELAST IC IT IES  OF  DE MAND  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Short-run own price elasticities of demand. 
Consumption category Price elasticity of demand
Food 0.6
Industrial goods 1.3
Services 1
Electricity 0.2
Natural gas 0.2
Heating oil 0.27
Car fuels 0.26
Air transport 0.25
Other transport 0.25
The dividend is the same across all households: 
$678 per person. For the bottom six deciles, this 
exceeds the amount paid in higher prices; for the 
top four deciles the charge exceeds the dividend. 
In other words, roughly 60% of Americans come 
out ahead in sheer monetary terms from the cap-
and-dividend policy, while 40% pay more in 
higher prices than they get back in their share of 
the dividends. The poorer the household, the 
larger the net benefit; the richer the household, 
the larger the net cost. The policy increases net 
incomes in the poorest decile by 24.0%, while net 
incomes in the richest decile decline by 2.7%. 
These estimates are decile averages. But for 
any individual household, the net impact of the 
cap-and-dividend policy depends on its con-
sumption pattern and how much it responds to 
changing relative prices by shifting from more  
carbon-intensive to less carbon-intensive con-
sumption. Any household that curtails its direct 
and indirect consumption of fossil fuels to a 
level below the national average comes out 
ahead, receiving more money in dividends than 
it pays in higher prices, regardless of its expen-
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Source: Authors’ calculations (see text for details). 
Charge Dividend Net benefit Charge Dividend Net benefit
1 1927 3.4 215 678 463 11.2% 35.2% 24.0%
2 3521 3.3 338 678 341 9.6% 19.3% 9.7%
3 4736 3.2 424 678 254 9.0% 14.3% 5.4%
4 5991 2.7 514 678 164 8.6% 11.3% 2.7%
5 7380 2.6 576 678 102 7.8% 9.2% 1.4%
6 8847 2.5 649 678 30 7.3% 7.7% 0.3%
7 10711 2.3 732 678 -53 6.8% 6.3% -0.5%
8 13228 2.1 837 678 -158 6.3% 5.1% -1.2%
9 17178 2.0 1024 678 -346 6.0% 3.9% -2.0%
10 29943 1.8 1475 678 -797 4.9% 2.3% -2.7%
Per capita incidence ($) As percentage of expendituresPer capita 
expenditure decile
Per capita 
expenditure ($)
Average 
household size
diture decile. The policy rewards “good behav-
ior” – reductions in carbon emissions – across 
the income spectrum.                 s         
s 
Cap-and-dividend versus cap-and-giveaway 
                          
Data on the distribution of stock ownership  
by income decile are presented in Table 8.
The cap-and-dividend distributional outcome 
differs radically from what would happen under a 
cap-and-giveaway policy in which carbon permits 
are distributed free-of-charge to fossil-fuel firms. 
Both policies would increase the prices of fossil 
fuels, and of other goods and services in propor-
tion to the use of fossil fuels in their supply, but 
instead of capturing the “rent” from  permit 
sales and rebating it to the public on an equal 
per person basis, the cap-and-giveaway policy 
would generate windfall profits for fossil-fuel 
firms. These profits would flow to shareholders 
in the form of higher dividends and capital gains, 
benefiting households in proportion to their 
ownership of corporate stock. In the words of a 
U.S. Congressional Budget Office report (2007. 
p. 2), a giveaway strategy “would transfer in-
come from energy consumers – among whom 
lower-income households would bear dispropor-
tionately large burdens – to shareholders of en-
ergy companies, who are disproportionately 
higher-income households.”20
21 
Stock ownership is concentrated in upper-
income households, with the top tenth owning 
nearly 65% of the total, and the top two-tenths 
owning 77%. Using these figures, we can ap-
proximate the distributional effects of a cap-
and-giveaway policy.22
Table 9 summarizes distributional outcomes un-
der these two policy scenarios. In contrast to cap-
and-dividend, the cap-and-giveaway policy results 
in a regressive redistribution of income and im-
poses net costs on the majority of American 
households: the bottom nine deciles pay more as 
a result of higher fuel prices than they receive in 
stock dividends and capital gains. The contrast 
between the distributional outcomes of the two 
policies is depicted graphically in Figure 5, with 
the deciles combined into quintiles for simplicity. 
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Source: Calculated from 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances. 
Per capita 
income decile
Stock 
ownership
Share of total 
stock 
o nership
1 7437 0.8%
2 4564 0.5%
3 8697 0.9%
4 16069 1.7%
5 23066 2.4%
6 40296 4.2%
7 54571 5.7%
8 67427 7.0%
9 116542 12.1%
10 626335 64.9%
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Based on a carbon charge of $200 per tC. 
Source: Authors’ calculations (see text for details). 
 
Net benefits per 
capita ($)
As % of total 
expenditures
Net benefits per 
capita ($)
As % of total 
expenditures
1 1927 3.4 -91 -4.7% 463 24.0%
2 3521 3.3 -244 -6.9% 341 9.7%
3 4736 3.2 -309 -6.5% 254 5.4%
4 5991 2.7 -355 -5.9% 164 2.7%
5 7380 2.6 -377 -5.1% 102 1.4%
6 8847 2.5 -342 -3.9% 30 0.3%
7 10711 2.3 -336 -3.1% -53 -0.5%
8 13228 2.1 -360 -2.7% -158 -1.2%
9 17178 2.0 -231 -1.3% -346 -2.0%
10 29943 1.8 2645 8.8% -797 -2.7%
Cap-and-Dividend
Per capita 
expenditure 
decile
Per capita 
expenditure ($) Household size
Cap-and-Giveaway
In the absence of revenue recycling, the price 
increases arising from a carbon cap that yields a 
$200/tC permit price would raise the cost of liv-
ing of the median American family by about 
$1,570 per year.23 It is unlikely that the public 
would welcome such belt-tightening, particularly 
if they see the money going from their pockets 
into windfall profits for energy companies. 
Whether the public would be much happier if the 
money instead went to the government, as would 
occur with a cap-and-spend policy (or a carbon 
tax) is an open question. In contrast to these 
other policies, cap-and-dividend protects the real 
incomes of middle-class and low-income house-
holds. The political implications of these differ-
ences among policy outcomes should be evident.          
 
Five caveats 
                
and (v) the omission of se
Like all models of the distributional impacts of 
public policies, the estimates presented in Table 
7 rest on a number of simplifying assumptions. 
We want to note five caveats in particular: (i) the 
assumption that the cost of carbon permits is 
passed through fully to consumers, rather than 
part of the cost being absorbed by producers via 
lower  profit  margins;  (ii) the assumption of con-
stant price elasticities of demand across expen-
diture deciles; (iii) the omission of welfare effects  
from  our  calculations; (iv) the omission of fossil 
fuel uses not tied to household consumption;  
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Source: Calculated from Ta
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impacts.  
“Pass-through” to consumers.
ronmental policies – whether in the form of 
regulations, pollution taxes, or marketable pollu-
tion permits – typically assume that the costs 
these policies impose on firms are fully passed 
through to consumers in the form of higher 
prices. We have followed this conventional prac-
tice. It is plausible, however, that some fraction 
of the costs of carbon permits will be absorbed 
by producers via reduced profits – a possibility 
that may help to explain why producers often 
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One reason why some firms might not shift the 
entire cost of carbon charges forward to con-
rship of cor-
ll households respond identi-
nd 
ility of income, the emi-
ure Survey (CEX) data on which 
 
 
sumers is that they are competing with other 
firms that are not equally impacted by the 
charges. Production costs of firms using less 
carbon-intensive technologies will rise less than 
those of firms in the same industry that use 
more carbon-intensive technologies.24 To de-
fend their market shares, the latter may trim 
profit margins rather than increasing prices to 
consumers enough to cover the full cost of their 
carbon permits. The ability of firms to absorb 
permit costs would be enhanced if they have 
been earning above-normal profits (for example, 
due to oligopolistic market power).  
Households would bear the cost of any profit 
squeeze in proportion to their owne
porate stock. As noted above, this is highly un-
equal. Less-than-100% pass-through therefore 
would reduce the regressivity of carbon charges 
and enhance the progressivity of a cap-and-
dividend policy. In the Appendix, we report cal-
culations on distributional outcomes based on 
varying assumptions as to the actual extent of 
pass-through. 
Constant price elasticities. In our calculations 
we assume that a
cally to price changes; that is, the price elasticity 
of demand does not vary across the expenditure 
spectrum. But there are plausible reasons to 
think that price elasticities may vary with in-
come. For example, lower-income households 
may tend to respond more strongly to higher 
prices than upper-income households: with less 
money, they have a stronger incentive to 
economize.25 In one of the few empirical studies 
of this question, West and Williams (2004) find 
that the lower-income households are more re-
sponsive to changes in the price of gasoline: in 
the poorest quintile they estimate the price elas-
ticity of demand to be -0.73 (in other words, a 
10% price rise leads to a 7.3% decline in de-
mand), whereas in the richest quintile the price 
elasticity is only -0.18. If this pattern could be 
generalized, it would imply that our estimates 
overstate the impact of carbon charges on lower-
expenditure households and hence understate 
the progressivity of a cap-and-dividend policy.26
Welfare effects. Our calculations refer only to 
the real-income effects of carbon charges a
revenue recycling. As noted above, we do not 
attempt to take into account the positive and 
negative welfare effects arising from reduced 
use of fossil fuels. But it bears repeating that 
the underlying rationale for policies to curb car-
bon emissions is that the benefits of doing so 
outweigh the costs. In an analysis of welfare 
effects that excludes benefits from reduced 
global warming, De Canio (2007) concludes that 
the distribution of carbon revenues has much 
stronger effects on household incomes than the 
macroeconomic effects of the carbon cap, and 
that an egalitarian distribution of carbon reve-
nues “will improve the material well-being of a 
majority of the agents, even without taking into 
account the environmental benefits of the 
emissions reductions.” 
Our analysis also does not take into account the 
diminishing marginal ut
nently plausible proposition that a dollar is 
worth more to a poor person than to a rich one. 
A cap-and-dividend policy would transfer dollars 
from richer households, where the marginal 
utility of a dollar is relatively low, to poorer ones, 
where the marginal utility of a dollar is relatively 
high. The incorporation of such “interpersonal 
comparisons” into a welfare-based accounting 
of distributional impacts would further reinforce 
the progressivity of the cap-and-dividend pol-
icy’s outcome. 
Non-household users of fossil fuels. The Con-
sumer Expendit
we rely for our calculations omit non-household 
end-users of fossil fuels and other goods and 
services. According to the national income ac-
counts (NIA), consumption represented 71% of 
U.S. GDP in 2003 (the remaining items are in-
vestment, net exports, and government spend-
ing).27 This is fairly close to the ratio of our CEX-
based measure of carbon emissions reported 
in Table 4 (3.67 mt/person/year) to total 
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U.S. emissions reported in Figure 1b (5.46 
mt/person/year).28
Carbon permits will raise prices to non-
re two ways 
 
cts. Finally, our calculations do 
dus-
 
.  EARMARKS FOR  
 
ne how the distribu-
results reported above assumed 
 
household end-users, too. For simplicity, we 
have omitted these from our calculations of 
both revenue and dividends, but the distribu-
tional outcome is not greatly affected by the 
omission. Assuming that carbon charges asso-
ciated with investment are passed to consum-
ers in the same way as variable input costs, the 
inclusion of investment would simply increase 
the magnitudes of revenue and dividends with-
out altering substantially the distributional pat-
tern of net benefits.29 Since carbon permit 
charges are levied on exports but not imports, 
omission of trade effects leads to a modest un-
derstatement of net benefits to U.S. house-
holds: part of the revenue rebated to them 
comes from foreign consumers, while the permit 
charges do not raise import prices.30
In the case of government, there a
to offset the impacts of higher fossil-fuel prices 
on real expenditure while providing the govern-
ments with an incentive to improve energy 
efficiency and shift to alternative energy 
sources. The first is to earmark a share of total 
carbon revenues to be directly recycled to fed-
eral, state and local governments, according to 
a formula based on their expenditures. Assum-
ing this share equals what they pay in increased 
costs as a result of higher fossil-fuel prices, our 
calculations of net benefits would be unaf-
fected. The second option is to dividend all of 
the carbon revenue to households, and let gov-
ernments recoup their higher costs through 
taxation. Assuming this is accomplished through 
progressive taxes, this would enhance the pro-
gressivity of net benefits from the cap-and-
dividend policy. 
Employment effe
not include the short-run impacts of carbon 
emission-reduction policies on employment. 
These include both negative impacts on fossil 
fuel-based sectors of the economy and positive 
impacts on other sectors, notably those involv-
ing alternative energy sources. Since the shift in 
relative prices raises labor demand in some 
sectors while lowering it in others, there is no 
obvious reason to expect a substantial impact 
on aggregate employment. But insofar as alter-
native energy sectors are more labor-intensive 
than fossil-fuel industries – and there is some 
evidence that this is the case – the change may 
generate net increases in employment, particu-
larly if investments are channeled into commu-
nities with high unemployment rates.
Labor does not move costlessly across in
tries and sectors, however. As we have noted, 
workers in fossil fuel-intensive industries could 
experience income losses as a result of policies 
that curtail carbon emissions. These adverse 
impacts could be offset by the provision of tran-
sitional adjustment assistance to the affected 
households and communities, an issue to which 
we turn in the next section. It is worth noting, 
however, that this issue arises with any public 
policy to reduce carbon emissions, not only a 
cap-and-dividend policy. Indeed, from the stand-
point of displaced workers, cap-and-dividend 
at least has the advantage of offsetting the  
impact of higher fossil fuel prices on their real 
incomes, in the absence of which they would 
face a double blow from price effects as well  
as employment impacts. 
 
V
NON-DIVIDEND USES
In this section we exami
tional outcome of a cap-and-dividend policy 
would differ if part of the revenue from carbon 
permits is earmarked initially for other uses, 
such as transitional adjustment assistance, 
rather than being entirely recycled as individual 
dividends.  
The baseline 
that all of the carbon revenues are recycled to 
individuals in the form of equal per capita divi-
dends. It is possible, however, that policy makers 
will decide to earmark part of the revenue from 
the sale of carbon permits for other uses, particu-
larly during the first few years of the policy’s im-
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
1 1927 24.0% 22.3% 20.6% 18.9% 17.2% 15.5%
2 3521 9.7% 8.7% 7.8% 6.8% 5.9% 5.0%
3 4736 5.4% 4.7% 4.0% 3.3% 2.6% 1.9%
4 5991 2.7% 2.2% 1.6% 1.1% 0.5% 0.0%
5 7380 1.4% 0.9% 0.5% 0.0% -0.4% -0.9%
6 8847 0.3% 0.0% -0.4% -0.8% -1.2% -1.5%
7 10711 -0.5% -0.8% -1.1% -1.4% -1.8% -2.1%
8 13228 -1.2% -1.5% -1.7% -2.0% -2.2% -2.5%
9 17178 -2.0% -2.2% -2.4% -2.6% -2.8% -3.0%
10 29943 -2.7% -2.8% -2.9% -3.0% -3.1% -3.2%
Per capita 
expenditure decile
Per capita 
expenditure ($)
Net benefit/expenditure with different withholding percentages
plementation. For example, part of the revenue 
might be devoted to transitional adjustment as-
sistance for workers and communities that suffer 
employment losses as a result of the reduced 
production and consumption of fossil fuels. 
Other possible uses of carbon revenues include 
revenues for 
spending on public goods (such as investments 
in renewable energy), cuts in other taxes, and 
what might be termed transitional adjustment 
assistance to corporations (for example, via 
give-aways of a fraction of the carbon permits 
free-of-charge). Each of these may have its own 
attractions on political grounds, but there are 
economic and political costs to devoting more 
than a modest share of carbon revenues to 
them for reasons explained below. 
The effects of withholding carbon 
other uses are shown in Table 10. We vary the 
percentage withheld from zero to 25% in five 
percentage-point increments, to show the sensi-
tivity of our results to alternative assumptions. 
As the percentage earmarked for other uses 
goes up, net benefits to households go down 
and the percentage of households who come 
out ahead (in purely monetary terms) de-
creases. Whereas the bottom six deciles receive 
positive net benefits when 100% of the revenue 
is distributed in individual dividends (our base-
line scenario, reproduced in the first column), 
only the bottom half receive positive net bene-
fits with 10% of the revenue earmarked for 
other uses. With 20% earmarked for other uses, 
only the bottom four deciles come out ahead. 
Note that these results refer only to the net im-
pact of higher fossil fuel prices and individual 
dividends, without taking into account the dis-
tributional effects of other uses of carbon reve-
nues. The latter would depend, of course, on 
precisely what these other uses are. If the other 
uses benefit lower-income and middle-income 
households, their losses from lower dividends 
could be offset and the distributional progressiv-
ity of the overall result possibly enhanced. On 
the other hand, if the other uses primarily bene-
fit upper-income households, this would reduce 
their losses and diminish the progressivity of  
the policy mix. 
In our view, there are good economic and politi-
cal reasons to minimize the extent of non-
dividend uses of carbon revenues: 
• First, the scale of other uses must be limited 
if we are to meet the central policy goal of 
reducing carbon emissions while protecting 
the real incomes of lower-income and mid-
dle-income households. We regard income 
protection as a crucial ingredient of climate 
policy: any policy that instead puts the  
economic burden on the poor and middle 
class risks a political backlash that could fa-
tally undermine public support for curbing 
carbon emissions. 
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• Second, greater investment in energy effi-
ciency and renewable energy sources will  
be induced by raising the price of fossil  
fuels and eliminating the implicit subsidy 
these now receive by virtue of the zero-
pricing of carbon emissions. Such invest-
ment could – and, we believe, should – be 
boosted further by redirecting explicit subsi-
dies from fossil fuels to renewables. Cur-
rently, federal subsidies for the fossil-fuel 
industry in the form of tax breaks and roy-
alty-free access to public lands are worth 
$24 billion per year (Andrews, 2007).31 Re-
orienting these would dramatically increase 
federal support for energy efficiency and re-
newables without tapping the revenue from 
sales of carbon permits. 
• Third, every dollar of revenues that is de-
voted to other uses is deducted equally from 
the dividends of all Americans, rich and poor 
alike. In other words, it is equivalent to a 
head tax: by taking a fixed amount from 
each person, it takes a higher percentage of 
income from the poor than from the rich. In 
effect, this would be one of the most regres-
sive taxes in the country, a retreat from the 
principle of using progressive taxation to 
fund social expenditures. 
• Fourth, using carbon revenues to make an 
equivalent cut in payroll taxes – as former 
vice-president Al Gore has advocated – 
would fail to protect the real incomes of 
lower-income and middle-income population 
who do not pay these taxes, including the 
elderly, the disabled and the unemployed.32 
It would also tie the future of Social Security 
and Medicare to a funding source that ulti-
mately will shrink as the transition to a post-
fossil fuel economy moves forward. 
• Finally, if carbon revenues are used to fi-
nance government expenditures or tax cuts, 
there is no guarantee as to what these uses  
will turn out to be. Instead of a cut in payroll 
taxes, for example, we could see a cut in 
corporate income taxes; indeed, this is the 
alternative to the cap-and-dividend policy 
that was analyzed in the CBO studies. In-
stead of financing expenditures on renew-
able energy or mass transit, we could see 
increased government spending on subsi-
dies for fossil fuel corporations. We live with 
the administrations we have, not necessarily 
those we want. A policy in which the reve-
nues are dedicated to individual dividends 
comes as close as possible to building a 
“locked box” that is not vulnerable to politi-
cal vicissitudes in future years. 
 
VI .  CONCLUSIONS 
A cap-and-dividend policy would combine an 
effective means to curb U.S. carbon emissions 
from burning fossil fuels with protection of real 
incomes of lower-income and middle-income 
Americans from the consequences of higher 
fossil fuel prices.  
Any policy that reduces carbon emissions will 
raise the prices of fossil fuels: higher prices are 
the handmaiden of lower demand. Higher prices 
for oil, coal, and natural gas will mean higher 
prices for goods and services produced with 
them. As documented in this study, these higher 
prices will hit the real incomes of lower-income 
and middle-income households harder than 
those of upper-income households. 
But higher prices for fossil fuels are only one 
side of the story. The other side is summed up 
by the question, “Who gets the money?” If the 
money is recycled to the public on an equal per 
capita basis, via cap-and-dividend, the impact of 
the emissions-reduction policy on the distribu-
tion of incomes is transformed: lower-income 
and middle-income households come out ahead 
in monetary terms, both absolutely and relative 
to upper-income groups.  
A cap-and-dividend policy has three basic steps: 
• First, U.S. carbon emissions are capped at a 
level that gradually declines over time. For 
example, if we reduce emissions at a rate of 
4% per year starting in 2010, we will cut 
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emissions to 20% of their 2010 level by the 
year 2050.  
• Second, based on the cap in a given year, 
permits are auctioned to firms that bring  
fossil carbon into the economy (whether 
through domestic extraction or imports). The 
supply of permits in a given year is fixed by 
the cap; their price depends on the demand 
for them. 
• Third, the revenue from the sale of permits 
is deposited into a trust fund and paid out to 
all individuals on an equal per person basis. 
In addition, some fraction of the revenue ini-
tially may be earmarked for other uses, such 
as transitional adjustment assistance. 
A cap-and-dividend policy has several attractive 
features. It asserts the principle of common 
ownership of nature’s wealth: rights to benefit 
from the U.S. share of the Earth’s capacity to 
absorb carbon are allocated equally to all 
Americans. It protects the real incomes of the 
majority of the population, overcoming a crucial 
political hurdle to the adoption of effective poli-
cies to curb global warming. It results in a pro-
gressive redistribution of income, a result that 
does not hinge on the propensity of present and 
future governments to use the revenues for 
egalitarian purposes. 
At a permit price of $200 per ton of carbon, the 
annual revenue from the sale of permits would 
amount to roughly $200 billion. If this revenue is 
recycled to individuals equally, the majority of 
households will receive positive net benefits: 
their dividends exceed the amount they pay as a 
result of higher fossil fuel prices. The net impact 
ranges from a 2.7% loss for the richest 10% of 
households to a 24.0% gain for the poorest 10%. 
 
 
 
 
 
This “baseline scenario” assumes that 100% of 
the cost of carbon permits is shifted to consum-
ers. If the extent of pass-through to consumers 
is less than 100%, and some of the cost is ab-
sorbed via lower profit margins, then the distri-
butional progressivity of the outcome is 
enhanced and the percentage of American fami-
lies who come out ahead increases. 
Allowing a modest fraction of the carbon reve-
nues to be earmarked initially for other uses, 
such as transitional adjustment assistance, 
could further enhance the political appeal of the 
cap-and-dividend policy. Our results indicate 
that up to ten per cent of the carbon revenues 
can be dedicated to other uses while maintain-
ing positive net benefits for roughly 50% of 
households; withholding carbon revenues be-
yond the 10% threshold pushes the net benefi-
ciary share of the population below half. 
In sum, a cap-and-dividend policy is a “win-win” 
option for the majority of Americans, maintain-
ing or increasing real incomes while curbing 
global warming and hastening the U.S. econ-
omy’s transition towards the energy sources of 
the future. Not only is it an attractive policy on 
environmental, economic, and political grounds; 
it is, as far as we know, the only policy that 
combines these virtues in a realistic proposal. If 
the American public engages actively in shaping 
the nation’s climate policies, the cap-and-
dividend policy could become not just an attrac-
tive idea but a historic breakthrough.  
 APPENDIX:   
Distributional Impact with Less-than-100% 
Pass-through to Consumers 
In this appendix, we examine how the distribu-
tional impact of a cap-and-dividend policy would 
differ if part of the cost of carbon permits is ab-
sorbed by producers in the form of lower profit 
margins, rather than being passed fully to con-
sumers in the form of higher prices. 
Little empirical research has been done to as-
certain the extent to which the cost of carbon 
permits will be passed through to consumers. In 
a recent literature review, Parry et al. (2005, p. 
32) remark that “empirical studies on the extent 
to which the costs of environmental policies are 
passed forward into higher prices of consumer 
products would be extremely valuable.” Studies 
on the extent of pass-through of sales and ex-
cise taxes have generated mixed results: some 
studies have found close to 100% pass-through, 
some have found significantly less, and still oth-
ers have found “overshifting” in which prices 
rise by more than the amount of the tax (Fuller-
ton and Metcalf 2004, pp. 1817-1823).33
If firms absorb part of the cost of carbon per-
mits via lower profit margins, this has two ef-
fects on our calculations. First, it reduces the 
incomes  of households in proportion to their 
ownership of corporate stock. Second, it trans-
lates into a higher permit price and higher total 
revenues for a given emission cap. (Permit 
prices rise because the reduction in demand for 
fossil fuels is a function of the price increases 
passed through to consumers; total revenues 
rise because demand is price-inelastic).  
To examine the effects of less-than-100% pass-
through of carbon charges to consumers, we 
assume that reductions in corporate profits are 
distributed amongst households on the basis of 
stock ownership as reported in Table 8. We vary 
the share of permit costs absorbed via lower 
profits from 0% (our baseline scenario) to 25% 
in five percentage-point increments, to show the 
sensitivity of the results to alternative assump-
tions. That is, we allow the percentage of the 
carbon charge that is passed through to con-
sumers to vary from 75% to 100%. 
The results are presented in Table A.1. The first 
column – with zero charge from profits, or 100% 
pass-through – shows the net distributional im-
pact of the cap-and-dividend policy as reported 
in Table 7. Subsequent columns show the dis-
tributional impact with rising shares of the per-
mit price coming from corporate profits. As the 
pass-through to consumers diminishes, net 
benefits to lower-income and middle-income 
households increase. Insofar as the carbon 
charges cut into corporate profits rather than 
being shifted fully to consumers, our baseline 
results understate the favorable distributional 
impacts of the cap-and-dividend policy.       s
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Note: Assumes 100% revenue recycling via dividends. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
1 1927 24.00% 25.70% 27.60% 29.70% 32.20% 35.00%
2 3521 9.70% 10.60% 11.70% 12.90% 14.30% 15.90%
3 4736 5.40% 6.00% 6.80% 7.70% 8.60% 9.80%
4 5991 2.70% 3.20% 3.80% 4.40% 5.10% 5.90%
5 7380 1.40% 1.80% 2.20% 2.60% 3.20% 3.80%
6 8847 0.30% 0.60% 0.80% 1.10% 1.50% 1.90%
7 10711 -0.50% -0.30% -0.20% 0.00% 0.20% 0.50%
8 13228 -1.20% -1.10% -1.00% -0.90% -0.80% -0.70%
9 17178 -2.00% -2.10% -2.10% -2.20% -2.20% -2.30%
10 29943 -2.70% -3.30% -4.10% -4.90% -5.80% -6.90%
$200.00 $210.53 $222.22 $235.29 $250.00 $266.67Carbon charge (per tC)
Per capita expenditure 
decile
Per capita 
expenditure ($)
Net benefit /expenditure with different percentage of charge from profits
    s
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1 EU-15 refers to the fifteen member states of the European 
Union as of 1995. Emissions for Germany prior to German 
reunification in 1990 are the total for West Germany and 
East Germany. 
2 Emissions resulting from electricity use are allocated across 
fuel sources on the basis of total emissions from the electric 
power sector. Emissions by sector: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/sec12_5.pdf.  
Emissions from electricity generation by fuel source: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/sec12_16.pdf. 
3 The data in Table 2 are drawn from the Consumer Expendi-
ture Survey, conducted quarterly for the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics by the Census Bureau. We pooled annual 
consumption data for households that began participating in 
the survey from the 3rd quarter of 2002 through the 2nd 
quarter of 2003. 
4 We calculated separate price impacts for air transport and 
“other transport” (including trains and mass transit), catego-
ries combined in Metcalf’s study, using data from the 1992 
input-output accounts (Lawson 1997). 
5 The higher per capita emissions shown in Figure 1b (5.5 
tC) include carbon emissions from other sources, such as 
government expenditure, in addition to those associated 
with household consumption. 
6 This is what happened when the European Union intro-
duced carbon permits for electric power generation and 
gave them free-of-charge to utility companies. For accounts, 
see Ball (2006) and Dutzik et al. (2007. p. 22). As Paltsev et 
al. (2007, p. 5) note, if regulated utility markets were to 
prevent price rises (and windfall profits), this would dissi-
pate the incentive for consumers to curb consumption. 
7 This is an extension of the ‘feebate’ concept, whereby fees 
are paid according to the extent of individual resource use, 
and the proceeds rebated equally to all use-rights holders. 
This idea has been applied to a variety of environmental 
problems; see, for example, Puig-Ventosa (2004). For an 
early application to gasoline taxes, see Shepard (1976). 
8 The so-called “tragedy of the commons” – in which unre-
stricted access to a scarce resource leads to its overuse – is 
more accurately termed the tragedy of open access, since 
communities often devise rules to protect common-property 
resources. Open access often leads to a second tragedy, too: 
those who reap most of the short-run benefits from open 
access are the wealthy and powerful, while those most se-
verely impacted by the long-run costs are the poor and rela-
tively powerless. For discussion, see Boyce (2002, pp. 7-8). 
9 It is possible to design alternative uses of carbon-charge 
revenues that are superior, at least in theory, to lump-sum 
redistribution on efficiency or distributional grounds (see 
Zhang and Baranzini 2004, pp. 511-2). In practice, however, 
these alternatives would be subject to the vagaries of fiscal 
politics. Moreover, Unlike the cap-and-dividend policy, they 
would not affirm the fundamental principle of equal rights to 
nature’s common wealth. 
10 For discussion of administrative costs, see also Fisher et 
al. (1998). As the CBO (2001, p. 19) notes, administrative 
costs would increase if charges were levied not only on fossil 
fuels, but also on imports of carbon-intensive products (such 
as aluminum) so as to avoid placing domestic producers at a 
disadvantage in the absence of similar carbon policies in the 
exporting countries. Presumably these cost increases would 
be offset by the additional revenue collected. 
11 A recent study of Italy’s carbon tax (Tiezzi 2005) finds that 
it has a progressive incidence, however, by virtue of the 
facts that it is designed to hit transport fuels harder than 
domestic fuel use and that higher-income Italian house-
holds were less responsive to higher prices. 
12 In assessing distributional impacts, researchers often 
stratify households on the basis of expenditure rather than 
income, on the grounds that expenditure is a better proxy 
for lifetime income and less subject to transitory shocks. We 
do the same in this paper. If incidence instead is calculated 
on the basis of income data, carbon charges generally ap-
pear to be even more regressive because expenditure-to-
income ratios typically decline as incomes rise. For discus-
sion, see Metcalf (1999). 
13 The give-away option, sometimes referred to as “grand-
fathering,” was the main method adopted when sulfur diox-
ide emission permits were introduced in the U.S. in the 
1990s. Insofar as the resulting windfall profits are taxed, this 
method generates some government revenue (albeit less 
than if the permits were sold by auction). In an analysis of the 
effects of grandfathered carbon emissions permits with prof-
its taxed at the rate of 35%, Parry (2004) likewise finds that 
the distributional impact is regressive even when coupled 
with lump-sum redistribution of the revenues recouped by 
taxation, due to the skewed distribution of profit income. 
14 The stronger distributional effects in the Dinan and 
Rogers study arise mainly from (i) use of a lower value for 
average income in the lowest quintile, and (ii) incorporation 
of an estimated “deadweight loss” in factor markets due to 
the impact of higher carbon prices on real returns to capital 
and labor. 
15 For a tool for calculating co-benefits, see Mulholland 
(2007). For estimates of damages from releases of particu-
lates, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxides in the U.S., see 
Muller and Mendelsohn (2007). 
16 The authors assume that dividends are distributed 
equally per person, rather than equally per household as in 
the CBO (2000) and Dinan and Rogers (2002) studies. 
17 A doubling of the permit price would not quite double total 
revenue and net benefits, because it would entail reduced 
demand and fewer permits. 
18 For energy sectors, the elasticities are based on the lit-
erature review by Dahl (1993). For food, services, and in-
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dustrial goods, we use Williamson’s (2006) “stylized facts  
of demand.” 
19 This falls near the middle of the $50-300 billion/year 
range (in 2007 dollars) that the U.S. Congressional Budget 
Office (2007, p. 2) reports as the likely value of carbon 
emission permits in 2020, based on a review of the existing 
literature and the range of emission-reduction goals cur-
rently being debated. 
20 One rationale sometimes offered for a cap-and-giveaway 
strategy is that it would compensate shareholders of fossil-
fuel companies for declines in stock values arising from 
lower sales. At the same time, however, shareholders of 
renewable-energy companies would be expected to experi-
ence increases in stock values due to higher sales. Some 
shareholders win, others lose. We see no compelling reason 
for the public to insure the shareholders of polluting firms 
against the risk that society will adopt policies to curb pollu-
tion. In any event, as the U.S. Congressional Budget Office 
(2007, p. 5) notes, compensation to adversely affected 
shareholders would require only a “small fraction” of the 
total value of carbon permits. Goulder (2002) estimates that 
a cap-and-giveaway policy with permits rising from a modest 
initial price of $25/tC to a final price of $50/tC would lead 
to a sevenfold increase in stock values for coal companies 
and to a doubling of  stock values for oil and gas firms. 
21 The deciles in Table 8 are grouped by per capita income 
rather than per capita expenditure. (The difference between 
the two probably explains the anomalous finding that the 
bottom decile owns somewhat more stock than the second 
lowest decile.) We have not found comparable data for 
expenditure deciles. These stock ownership data include 
both direct ownership of stocks and indirect ownership 
through mutual funds and other sources. For discussion, 
see Bucks et al. (2006). 
22 For simplicity, we assume that all windfall profits are 
recycled to U.S. households in proportion to their stock 
ownership. In practice, some profits would “leak” out of the 
country in returns to foreign owners of stock in fossil-fuel 
companies, diminishing net benefits of the cap-and-
giveaway policy to U.S. households. Some profits might also 
be withheld from shareholders and instead used to increase 
executive compensation. For both reasons, the cap-and-
giveaway results presented in Table 9 can be regarded as a 
“best-case” approximation that, if anything, understates net 
costs for the majority of households. 
23 This is the average per capita charge for the 5th and 6th 
deciles, multiplied by the average household size in these 
deciles, as reported in Table 7. 
24 A similar situation could arise for tradable goods produc-
ers who face competition from foreign firms not covered by 
the carbon permit mandate. All else equal, the introduction 
of carbon permits in the U.S. economy would make imports 
more competitive and exports less competitive. In industries 
where these trade effects are significant, there is a case for 
corrective policies: tariffs on imports (based on fossil carbon 
emissions in their production) and dividends on exports. 
Careful research is needed to assess needs for such com-
pensating policies. We note, however, that many foreign 
competitors (notably in Europe) now pay higher prices for 
fossil fuels than U.S. producers, due to government environ-
mental and taxation policies. In these cases, it would be 
difficult to argue that introducing carbon permits would place 
U.S. firms at an unfair disadvantage. More generally, trade 
competitiveness depends on many factors – including ex-
change rates, labor costs, taxation, and the pace of techno-
logical innovation – and these are likely to overshadow the 
effects of environmental policies, which empirical studies 
generally find to be quite small (for discussions, see Good-
stein 1999 and Ackerman 2006). 
25 To be sure, lower-income households devote a higher 
proportion of their expenditure to necessities than to luxu-
ries, and from this it is sometimes inferred that they tend to 
be less responsive, for example, to changes in the price of 
gasoline (Kayser 2000). But the same reasoning applies to 
non-fuel expenditures by lower-income households: not 
cutting gasoline consumption in response to higher prices 
would imply bigger cutbacks in other necessities such as 
food and health care. A more plausible reason to expect 
greater price responsiveness among upper-income house-
holds is that in some cases (such as buying more energy-
efficient vehicles), cutbacks in fuel consumption require 
investments in expensive durable goods. 
26 Other studies of price elasticity differences across the 
income spectrum have produced mixed results. West 
(2004) and Archibald and Gillingham (1980) also find that 
lower-income US households are more responsive to gaso-
line prices than are upper-income households, while Kayser 
(2000) reports a contrary finding. In a study in the United 
Kingdom, Dargay and Vythoulkas (1999) also find greater 
price-responsiveness among lower-income households: the 
long-run elasticity of car ownership with respect to running 
costs is -0.92 for low-income groups, -0.51 for middle-
income groups, and -0.38 for high-income groups (see also 
U.K. Department for Transport, 2006). In a study of Den-
mark, Brännlund and Nordstrom (2004) find little variation 
across income groups in the price elasticities of demand for 
gasoline and other goods. 
27 Unlike the CEX, the NIA consumption measure includes 
expenditures by non-profit institutions serving households, 
which account for roughly 11% of consumption, or 8% of 
GDP (based on 1993 data cited by Garner et al. 2006, p. 
22). Subtracting this from the NIA measure, household 
consumption represented roughly 63% of national income. 
28 Another possible source of discrepancy between the two 
figures is under-reporting of consumption in the CEX. The 
CEX-based estimate of total consumption in the United 
States, derived from household surveys, is roughly 60% of 
the National Income Accounts-based estimate of aggregate 
consumption, derived primarily from economic censuses of 
firms (for discussion, see Garner et al. 2006). In part, this 
disparity arises from definitional differences (for example, 
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the latter includes consumption by many non-profit institu-
tions whereas the CEX does not), and in part from meas-
urement errors in one or both instruments. Insofar as under-
reporting in the CEX accounts is to blame, this would affect 
the pattern of distributional impacts reported here only if 
the under-reporting were uneven across expenditure dec-
iles. Since we lack adequate data on which to assess this 
possibility, we make do with the data at hand. If the degree 
of any under-reporting in the CEX is roughly constant across 
deciles, then its only effect on the distributional impacts of a 
cap-and-dividend policy reported in Table 7 would be on 
absolute magnitudes, not on the pattern of relative impacts 
across deciles. 
29 If investment per unit output and carbon emissions per 
dollar investment are roughly the same across sectors, 
inclusion of investment-related emissions would somewhat 
reduce the disparities in carbon content across consump-
tion categories reported in Table 3. Since low-carbon cate-
gories account for a larger share of expenditure by upper-
income households, this would reduce the regressivity of 
carbon charges and enhance the progressivity of the cap-
and-dividend outcome. 
30 In some cases, however, trade policies may compensate 
for these effects; see note 24. 
31 To put this number in perspective, in 2005 public expen-
diture on research & development for wind energy, fuel cells 
and photovoltaics combined was about $250 million (Kam-
men and Nemet 2005, p. 86). 
32 See “Solving the Climate Crisis,” speech by Al Gore at 
New York University, 18 September 2006. Available at 
http://www.nyu.edu/community/gore.html. 
 
 
N O T E  T O  A P P E N D I X  
33 A related but distinct issue is the impact of higher prices 
on the “welfare triangles” of consumers’ surplus and pro-
ducers’ surplus. Basic microeconomic theory tells us that 
the ratio of these welfare losses depends on price elastic-
ities of demand and supply: the more inelastic the demand 
curve, the higher the share of consumers; the more inelastic 
the supply curve, the higher the share of producers. These 
calculations assume that the full cost of carbon permits (or 
carbon taxes) is passed through to consumers. If the supply 
curve is not perfectly elastic, the reduction in output leads to 
a decline in marginal cost and this dampens the rise in the 
market price, but consumers still are assumed to pay the 
full carbon charge (the difference between the marginal cost 
of production without permits and the market price with 
permits). Here we do not attempt to incorporate the welfare 
losses from reduced consumers’ surplus and producers’ 
surplus, nor the welfare gains from reduced carbon emis-
sions, for reasons explained in section 3. 
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